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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ALICE LITTLE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Docket No. 900090 
-vs-
Priority Classification 14b 
R. H. MCMASTER, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT to the above-captioned 
appeal (hereinafter "plaintiff) and hereby submits the following 
as her opening brief herein: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court to 
decide the appeal in this action pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-2-2(iii)(j) (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, 
granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in granting defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. CASES. STATUTES AND RULES. ETC, 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or case law authorities thought by plaintiff to 
be wholly determinative of this matter. However, plaintiff 
asserts that the case of C. S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 
1988), a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto, 
designated as "Addendum A" and incorporated herein by reference, 
may be dispositive of some of the issues raised. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE / STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. This is a medical malpractice action by plaintiff 
against the defendant, Dr. R. H. McMaster. 
2. The defendant performed tubal ligation surgery upon the 
plaintiff on or about May 2, 1985. 
3. Prior to the surgery the plaintiff signed a consent to 
sterilization form which authorized Dr. McMaster to perform the 
tubal ligation (sterilization) surgery This consent to 
sterilization operation stated, among other things, "I understand 
that the sterilization must be considered permanent and not 
reversible. I have decided that I do not want to become pregnant 
or bear children, but understand that the results from this 
procedure cannot be guaranteed." A true and correct copy of the 
consent and release signed by plaintiff is attached hereto, 
designated as "Addendum B" and incorporated herein by reference. 
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4. In approximately January of 1986, the plaintiff again 
became pregnant and subsequently gave birth to her fifth child• 
5. Plaintiff timely filed an action against the defendant 
alleging that the defendant had failed to obtain her informed 
consent to the tubal ligation/sterilization surgery, in that he 
failed to advise her in advance of the surgery that there was 
still a possibility she could conceive and bear a child after 
performance of the surgery. 
6. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary 
judgment in the lower court alleging that plaintiff could not 
recover on her claim of lack of informed consent as a matter of 
law. The defendant's motion for summary judgment came on for 
hearing before the Second Judicial District Court in and for 
Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, 
Judge presiding, on January 29, 1990. After oral argument on the 
motion, the Court granted the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment and an order embodying the Court's oral ruling was 
subsequently signed and entered by the Court. A true and correct 
copy of this Order is attached hereto, designated as "Addendum CH 
and incorporated herein by reference. 
7. From the order granting defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, plaintiff has filed this timely appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court abused its discretion by granting the motion 
of the defendant, McMaster, for summary judgment. 
Substantial and material issues of fact exist in this 
3 
matter, making summary judgment inappropriate as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST 
IN THIS MATTER, MAKING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IMPROPER AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The trial court may not grant a motion for summary judgment 
if substantial and material issues of fact exist. The trial 
court may not grant a motion for summary judgment unless the 
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Substantial and material issues of fact exist in the instant 
case, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. 
First, it should be noted that a cause of action for 
"wrongful birth" has been expressly authorized in the State of 
Utah. See, C. S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988). 
Therefore, plaintiff's cause of action for an unwanted pregnancy 
and live birth of a healthy child has previously been expressly 
authorized. 
Given this Court's authorization of such a cause of action, 
a dispute of fact exists herein for which a jury should be 
permitted to weigh the credibility of witnesses and to ascertain 
the facts. 
Plaintiff has asserted that defendant failed to obtain her 
informed consent to the tubal ligation surgery because he failed 
to advise her that it was still possible for her to become 
pregnant even after performance of this "sterilization" surgery. 
Defendant has countered by alleging that the consent to the 
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surgery signed by plaintiff (Addendum A hereto) adequately 
informs her of the risks of pregnancy subsequent to the surgery. 
However, plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Steven Shirts, submitted 
an affidavit to the Court indicating that, in his professional 
opinion, the consent of the plaintiff obtained herein was 
inadequate. A true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Dr. 
Steven R. Shirts is attached hereto, designated as "Addendum D" 
and incorporated herein by reference. 
Dr. Shirts asserted in his affidavit before the Court at the 
time of hearing on the motion for summary judgment that he had 
reviewed the "Statement of Understanding and Consent to 
Sterilization Operation" and that, in his opinion, the meaning of 
this consent form would be unclear to the average layman. Dr. 
Shirts stated, in Paragraph 4 of his affidavit, that, in his 
opinion, the consent form was not adequate to inform the patient 
that she may still become pregnant after performance of the tubal 
ligation. 
Further, Dr. Shirts, set forth that the performance of a 
tubal ligation immediately post-caesarean would result in 1 
pregnancy in 125, as opposed to 1 in 300 if the sterilization 
procedure were performed six weeks or more post-delivery. He 
expressed his opinion that any patient contemplating a tubal 
ligation should be informed of those options and statistics and 
the risks of becoming pregnant in spite of the surgery. (See 
Paragraph 5 of the Shirts affidavit.) 
Dr. Shirts summed up his findings in Paragraph 9 of his 
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affidavit by stating that, in his opinion, defendant fell below 
the standard of care of physicians practicing in the State of 
Utah in his treatment of the plaintiff in failing to advise her 
of "substantial and serious risks of her tubal ligation surgery" 
and in failing to advise her clearly that she might become 
pregnant after the surgery. 
The affidavit and testimony of Dr. Shirts creates an issue 
of fact as to whether or not the defendant fell below the 
standard of care in his treatment of the plaintiff in failing to 
obtain her informed consent and in failing to advise her of a 
substantial and material risk of her surgery. 
Given this substantial and material issue of fact regarding 
the negligence of the defendant and his duty to advise plaintiff 
of certain things prior to her surgery, summary judgment herein 
was clearly improper. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the trial court should be reversed and the 
matter remanded for jury trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ^ILh day of June, 1990. 
C0RP0R0N & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
Jh-L 
MARYr C 
Attorney 
CORPORON 
foy Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff/appellant 
herein, and that I caused the foregoing Brief of Appellant to be 
served upon defendant/respondent by placing A true and correct 
copy of the same in an envelope addressed to; 
GARY D. STOTT 
Attorney for Respondent 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
and depositing the same, sealed and with first class postage pre-
paid and affixed thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake 
City, Utah on the ^ *y day of June, 1990. 
r c . /CORPOJW5N 
Axtorne^ fo^Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Utah m PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
C.S., Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Norman NIELSON, BtDn 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 870039. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 6,1988. 
Mother who gave birth to normal and 
Jthy child brought action against physi-
\ claiming negligence in not informing 
1
 that sterilization procedure was not 
jsolute in nature" and that alternative 
rilization procedures were available with 
ying success rates. The United States 
strict Court for the District of Utah, 
vid Sam, J., certified questions of wheth-
claim for "wrongful pregnane/' result-
; in birth of normal, healthy child as 
suit of unsuccessful sterilization proce-
re performed by physician gave rise to 
rt claim for damages under state laws, 
id if tort claim for "wrongful pregnancy" 
is recognized, what was appropriate mea-
gre of damages. The Supreme Court, 
all, C I , held that (1) mother's suit was 
•rrectly viewed as "wrongful pregnancy" 
use of action; (2) action based on wrong-
il pregnancy was valid cause of action; 
) recoverable damages included any medi-
il and hospital expenses incurred as result 
[ physician's negligence, physical and 
iental pain and damages suffered by 
lother, wages necessarily lost by mother 
nd/or father, and punitive damages, if 
pplicable; and (4) projected cost of rearing 
lOrmal, healthy child could not be recov-
red. 
Questions answered. 
Durham and Zimmerman, JJ., filed 
opinions concurring and dissenting. 
Zimmerman, J., filed opinion concur-
ring and dissenting. 
Howe, Associate C I , filed dissenting 
1. Physicians and Surgeons ^18.110 
"Wrongful pregnancy," or "wrongful 
conception" as it is occasionally termed, 
refers to those cases where patients bring 
claim on their own behalf for monetary and 
emotional damages they suffered as result 
of giving birth to normal and healthy but 
unplanned and unwanted child; such ac-
tions are usually based upon negligently 
performed or counseled sterilizaton proce-
dure or abortion, or negligence in prepar-
ing or dispensing contraceptive prescrip-
tion. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
.^; 
C.S. v. NIELSON 
Ouu767PidS04(Utabl98S) 
Utah 505 
2. Physicians and Surgeons «=>18.110 
"Wrongful birth" refers to cause of 
action whereby parents claim they would 
have avoided conception or terminated ex-
isting pregnancy by abortion but for negli-
gence of those charged with, among other 
things, prenatal testing or counseling as to 
likelihood of giving birth to physically or 
mentally impaired child. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Physicians and Surgeons ^18.110 
"Wrongful life" is action by or on be 
half of impaired child alleging that but for 
medical professional's negligence, child 
would not have been bom to experience 
pain and suffering associated with his or 
her affliction or impairment 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Physicians and Surgeons $=18,110 
Action by mother contending that phy-
sician was negligent in not informing her 
that sterilization procedure was not "abso-
lute in nature" and that alternative sterili-
zation procedures were available with vary-
ing success rates, was "wrongful pregnan-
cy" cause of action. 
5. Physicians and Surgeons $=18,110 
Action based on wrongful pregnancy is 
valid cause of action. 
6. Physicians and Surgeons ^18.110 
Action for 'wrongful pregnancy does 
not violate statute setting out state policy 
in favor of right to life, statute stating that 
act or omission preventing abortion is not 
actionable, and statute stating that failure 
or refusal to prevent birth is not defense in 
any action, as legislation sought to address 
wrongful life and wrongful birth actions 
and issues, but not wrongful pregnancy 
actions and issues. U.C.A.1953,78-11-23 
to 78-11-25. 
7. Physicians and Surgeons $=>18.110 
If proven, damages in wrongful preg-
nancy action are recoverable for any medi-
cal and hospitalization expenses incurred as 
result of physician's negligence, including 
cost of initial unsuccessful sterilization op-
eration, prenatal care, child birth, postnatal 
care, and any increased cost for second 
sterilization operation if obtained; compen-
sation for physical and mental pain and 
damage suffered by mother as result of 
pregnancy and subsequent child birth and 
as result of undergoing sterilization opera-
tion and during reasonable recovery period; 
wages necessarily lost by mother and/or 
father of child; and punitive damages, if 
Jay V. Barney, Phillip B. Shell, Murray, 
for plaintiff and appellant 
J. Anthony Eyre, J. Mark Whimpey, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellee. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
The United States District Court for the 
District of Utah certified two questions of 
law to this Court under rule 41 of our 
Court rules.1 The parties to the pending 
federal court action have submitted briefs 
setting forth their positions on these certi-
fied questions: 
1. Does a claim for "wrongful pregnan-
cy" resulting in the birth of a normal, 
healthy child as a result of an unsuccess-
ful sterilization procedure performed by 
a physician give rise to a tort claim for 
damages under the laws of the State of 
Utah? 
2. In the event a tort claim for "wrong-
ful pregnancy" is recognized by the laws 
of the State of Utah, what is the appro-
priate measure of damages? 
/. Facts 
The facts accompanying the certified 
applicable. (Per Hall, C I , with one Justice
 q u e s t j o n s indicate "that defendant per-
formed a tuba! ligation procedure (a sever-
ance of the fallopian tubes for sterilization) 
on plaintiff.2 Subsequently, plaintiff be-
came pregnant and gave birth'to a normal 
and healthy child. Plaintiff now contends 
that defendant was negligent in not inform-
ing her that the procedure was not "abso-
lute in nature" and that alternative sterili-
zation procedures were available with vary-
ing success rates. Plaintiffs assertion of 
damages includes claims for medical ex-
penses incurred during her pregnancy and 
the birth of the child, medical expenses 
concurring.) 
8. Damages o«2(2) 
To obtain damages in wrongful preg-
nancy action, parents need not have miti-
gated their damages by aborting or placing 
child for adoption. (Per Hall, C I , with one 
Justice concurring.) 
9. Physicians and Surgeons ^18.110 
In wrongful pregnancy actions, 
projected cost of rearing normal, healthy 
child may not be recovered. (Per Hall, 
C I , with one Justice concurring.) 
1. Rule 41 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court in pertinent part provides: 
The Utah Supreme Court may in its discretion 
answer a question of Utah law certified to it 
by a court of the United States when request-
ed to do so by such certifying court acting in 
accordance with the provisions of this rule, 
but only if the state of the law of Utah appli-
cable to a proceeding before the certifying 
court is uncertain and answering the certified 
Question will not undulv interfere with the 
Utah Supreme Court's regular functioning or 
be inconsistent with the timely and orderly 
development of the decisional law of the state. 
1 We agree with the Supreme Court of West 
Virginia that "[b]ecause of the emotional, mor-
al, and philosophical implications" inherent in 
cases such as this one, styling the case using the 
plaintiffs initials will "help to preserve the sane-
lity of the famil[y] involved." James C. v, Cascr-
% 332 S.L2d 872,874 n. 1 (W.Va.1985). 
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ed in haying a hysterectomy per-
d subsequent to the birth of the child, 
ional trauma" during and after the 
ancy because of her concerns that the 
may inherit "plaintiffs psychiatric 
>ms," pain and suffering, and the 
of "rearing an unplanned child." The 
issues before us are whether Utah 
j i m this cause of action and, if so, 
itent of the recoverable damages. 
//. Mure of the Action 
I Initially, "wrongful pregnancy" 
; be distinguished from the related 
is of "wrongful birth" and "wrongful 
' "Wrongful prepancy," or "wrong-
onception" as it is occasionally termed, 
rs to those cases where parents bring a 
n on their own behalf for the monetary 
emotional damages they suffered as a 
.It of giving birth to a normal and 
thy but unplanned and unwanted child. 
b actions are usually based upon a neg-
ntly performed or counseled steriliza-
procedure or abortion, or negligence in 
paring or dispensing a contraceptive 
scription.3 
Su Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire Casual 
Co., 713 ?.U 384,392 (ColoApp.1985); Siem-
n\ec v. Lutheran Gen Hosp., 117 I11.2d 230, 
J7/111 IlLDec. 302.307. 512 N.£.2d 691.696 
,987); Johnston v. Bkins, 241 Kan. 407,410-
1.736 P.2d 935,938 (1987); SmilA v. Cor«; 728 
.W.2d 738, 741 (Tcnn.1987), and cases cited 
lercin (birth of normal child resulting from 
liled abortion); Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 
82,343 S.E.2d 301,304 (1986), and cases cited 
herein; su also W. Prosser & W. Keaton, Torts 
55, at 372-73 (5th ed. 1984). 
Su Siemieniec, 117 Iltfd at 235-36, 111 111. 
)cc at 306,316, 512 N.L2d at 695,705, and 
:ases cited therein (The courts which have con-
;idcred wrongful birth claims have been almost 
manimous in their recognition of a cause of 
action against a physician or other health-care 
provider where it is alleged that but for the 
defendants' negligence the parents would have 
terminated the congenially or genetically defec-
tive fetus by abortion"). Some courts have 
confused actions for wrongful birth and wrong-
ful pregnancy. Su, e,g.t Sukeres ex rel S v l 
erts v. Robinson, 102 Nev. 93,97-98,715 P.2d 
1076,1079 (1986); Be&rdsley v. Wierdsma, 650 
P.2d 288,289-90 (Wyo.1982). 
. Su Simieniec, 117111.2d at 236-37, 111 III. 
[2,3] "Wrongful birth," on the other 
hand, refers to the cause i f action whereby 
parents claim they would have avoided con-
ception or terminated an existing pregnan-
cy by abortion but for ^ negligence of 
those charged with, among other things, 
prenatal testing or counseling as to the 
likelihood of giving birth to a physically or 
mentally impaired chili* "Wrongful life" 
is \ht corresponding action by or on behalf 
of an impaired child alleging that but for 
the medical professional's negligence, ^ 
child would not have been born to experi-
ence the pain and suffering associated with 
' his or her affliction or impairment.5 
[4,5] Given ^ distinctions, the in-
stant case is correctly viewed as involving 
a wrongful pregnancy cause of action. A 
vast majority of jurisdictions recognize that 
a cause of action for wrongful pregnancy 
exists in tort* Courts essentially view 
wrongful pregnancy actions as indistin-
guishable from ordinary medical malprac-
tice zctlons where a plaintiff alleges a phy-
sician's breach of duty and injury resulting 
therefrom.1 Indeed, much of the analytical 
reasoning utilized in these cases revolves 
around \i\^ fact that if the physician has 
C.S. ?. NIELSON Utah 507 
ate«767 PJU1504 (Uuh 19SS) 
negligently performed a sterilization opera- formed consent, the patient must prove 
therein; su also Brugeman tx rel Brugeman 
v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 249, 718 P.2d 635, 
638-39 (1986), and cases cited therein "(The 
majority of American jurisdictions have refused 
to recognize an action for wrongful life,"). One 
of the concerns enumerated for genera] unwill-
ingness to permit damages in the wrongful life 
action has been expressed as an impossibility 
"for the trier of fad to measure damages by 
placing the child in the position he would have 
been in had he not been born." Sherlock v. 
Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.Wid 169, 172 n. 3 
(Minn.1977) (citations omitted). 
6. Sulachon v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172,179 
& n. 2,347 S.E2d 743,74748 An. 2 (1986), and 
cases cited therein. 
7. 11347 S.Eid at 747. Some courts that recog-
nize a cause of action for wrongful pregnancy 
do so based in part upon the claim that the right 
to abstain from having children through the use 
of sterilization is a right recognized to be of 
federal constitutional dimensions. See, tgn 
Moms v. Sanchez 746 ?2& 184,185-86 (Okla. 
1987); i i at 191 & n. 4 (Opala, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); infra note 47 and 
accompanying text But su Johnston, 241 Kan. 
at 411,736 P.2d at 939 (no constitutional issue 
invAlvwi in cause of action). 
tion, he or she has breached a duty to the 
patient, and from a proximate cause stand-
point, it is foreseeable that a child will be 
born and the parents will incur damages as 
a result of this negligence.8 The court in 
Boone v. Mullendore* summarized this 
view: 
[I]n order to state a cause of action for 
negligence, the plaintiff must show that 
the defendant has a legal duty, that the 
defendant has breached that duty, that 
the defendant's breach proximately 
caused an injury, and that damages have 
resulted to the plaintiff. It is also the 
law in Alabama that a physician owes a 
duty to exercise reasonable care in the 
treatment of his or her patients. There-
fore, if proven, the negligent misrepre-
sentation of the nature of the surgery 
and/or such negligent performance of 
that surgery as would wrongfully cause 
a patient to become pregnant would be a 
breach of that duty.10 
This statement and the rationale underly-
ing the majority view are in accord with 
established principles of negligence theo-
. r y n and our general law regarding proof 
of malpractice as set out in Schmidt v. 
Intemountain Health Care, Inc.:n "In 
order to recover for the negligence of a 
medical practitioner, a plaintiff must prove 
that (1) there was negligence and (2) the 
negligence was a proximate cause of the 
plaintiffs injury."13 This view is also in 
keeping with the statutory requirements disagree. Those sections provide: 
which a patient must prove in order to 78-11-23. Right to life-State policy. 
the following: 
(a) that a provider-patient-relationship 
existed between the patient and health 
care provider; and 
(b) the health care provider rendered 
health care to the patient; and 
(c) the patient suffered personal injuries 
arising out of the health care rendered; 
and 
(d) the health care rendered carried with 
it a substantial and significant risk of 
causing the patient serious harm; and 
(e) the patient was not informed of the 
substantial and significant risk; and 
(f) a reasonable, prudent person in the 
patient's position would not have con-
sented to the health care rendered after 
having been fully informed as to all facts 
relevant to the decision to give consent 
In determining what a reasonable, pru-
dent person in the patient's position 
would do under the circumstances, the 
trier of fact shall use the viewpoint of 
the patient before health care was pro-
vided and before the occurrence of any 
personal injuries alleged to have arisen 
from said care; and 
(g) the unauthorized part of the health 
care rendered was the proximate cause 
of personal injuries suffered by the pa-
tient" 
[6] Defendant, however, argues that 
plaintiffs claim is barred by Utah Code 
Ann. §{ 78-11-23 through -25 (1987). We 
recover damages from a health care provid-
er for failure to obtain informed consent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5(1) (1987) lists 
these requirements: 
For a patient to recover damages from a 
health care provider in an action based 
upon the provider's failure to obtain in-
8. Su, tg., James C, 332 S.L2d at 876. 
9. 416 So2d 718 (Aia.1982). 
10. l i at 720 (citations omitted). 
11. Su generally Weber ex rel Weber v. Spring-
vUk 725 P2d 1360,1363 (Utah 1986) (elements 
of negligence action). 
The Legislature finds and declares that 
it is the public policy of this state to 
encourage all persons to respect the 
right to life of all other persons, regard-
less of age, development, condition or 
dependency, including all handicapped 
persons and all unborn persons. 
11 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981). 
13. l i at 101 (citations omitted). 
14. Su also Burton v. Youngblood, 711 Pid 245, 
249 (Utah 1985) (application of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-5(1)). 
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78-11-24. Act or omission preventing garding a surgical procedure designed to 
abortion not actionable. prevent her from being able to conceive. 
A cause of action shall not arise, and Clearly, "[a] person's decision not to con-
damages shall not be awarded, on behalf ceive a child and to undergo surgical steri-
of any person, based on the claim that lization should not be confused with one's 
but for the act or omission of another, a decision to abort a child already con-
person would not have been permitted to ceivei"16 In order for us to adopt defend-
have been born alive but would have
 anfs view, we must ignore established and 
been abortei proven principles of tort law as well as the 
78-11-25. Failure or refusal to prevent fact that in this case and others like it, it is 
birth not a defense. not the birth or life of the child, but rather 
The failure or refusal of any person to "the 'pregnancy [of the mother] as a medi-
prevent the live birth of a person shall
 Cflj condition that gives rise to compensa-
not be a defense in any action, and shall y e damages an(j completes the elements 
not be considered in awarding damages for a ^\m 0f negligence."" This we will 
or child support, or in imposing a penal-
 not ^ 
ty, in any action. . 
,n . . „ ,. . . lL , lL. Furthermore, to disregard the • plain Ian-Emphasis added. In arguing that this . ..
 4 . . \ k 4 r .. .. 
., ,. . j , , guage and object of the statutes and hold legislation precludes wrongful pregnancy , . , .
 4 , ,, t
 e , j , , . .. , ., as defendant urges us to do would create' 
causes of action, defendant mistakes the , . , . ,, 
plain language of the statutes as well as ^ c o n c e ™ "** "* ** court m Joh' 
the nature of plaintiffs claim. $ion v' Elku 
The plain language of the legislation evi- The failure to ^ ^ a ^ s e of 
dences that it seeks to address stalled act]0n a S a m s t a ?hysician who ™ l ] ] ^ 
wrongful life and wrongful birth actions ^ P r l o m s u r e i c a l sterilization proce-
and issues. As noted above, these terms dures would k a %m[ of absolut*inv 
are descriptive titles for claims made by m u n i ty * ° a Ph)'sician whose n e ? % e n c e 
deformed or impaired children and their results in injury to the patient We i t 
parents, respectively, against physicians or cline to grant such immunity. We see no 
other health care providers for negligent reason why a physician who performs 
medical treatment or advice which, in such surgery should be held to a lesser 
words similar to those in the instant slat- standard of care than a physician or sur-
utes, deprived the parents of the opportuni- geon who performs any other surgical 
ty of deciding to prevent the live birth by procedure, Such a ruling could lead to a 
choosing to abort a deformed or impaired decrease in the standard of care, and 
fetus.15 would leave \ictims of professional negli-
Such language emphasizes the critical gence without a remedy!1'! A physician 
distinction between the types of claims who *®m® responsibility for a sterili-
sought to be precluded by the Utah stat- wtion procedure at the request of a pa-
utes in question and the claim alleged in tient assumes a professional duty to ren-
the instant case. Here, plaintiff sought a der appropriate service, including testing 
means to avoid pregnancy itself. Indeed, and advice regarding the procedure, ex-
the injur}' she claims resulted from the fact ercising the same standard of care appli-
that she became pregnant allegedly due to cable to other members of the medical 
her physician's negligent counseling re- profession in the community. A physi-
13. See Jacbon, 318 K.C. at 180,347 S.L2d at 17. Jacbon, M N.C at 181,347 S.E.2d at 748 
748; see cbo supro notes 4-5 and accompanying (some emphasis added), 
text In deciding the issues presented in this 
case, we do not rule upon the constitutionality j ^ 241 Kan 407 736 P.2d 935 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-11-23 through -25. 
16. Morris, 746 ?2d at 191 (Opala, J, concurring 19« &* lm^ Ulah Const- art 1, § 11. 
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in 
original). 
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cian is not required to guarantee the ///. Nature of Damages 
success of the procedure. Failure of the m. • •
 u-r j *,-
, . . .. , The remaining certified question re-physician to achieve success does not au- . ., . -( ,, , ., . f ; . ,. . ,. ,.
 TT quests that we specify the damages that tomatically indicate negligence. He or , , , ' , , 
, . , • J i • a are recoverable in a wrongful pregnancy 
she is only required to exercise the re- .
 D.. cu .
 r
 ,
 lL
J 
. , . , , . , . ,, action. Plaintiff seeks recovery for the 
quired standard of care during toe sur- . . . . .. . , 
,. ,, .. .. . .. ., medical expenses incurred during her preg-
gerv and in later attempting to verify the , , , . , , , ,.,, \ 
success or failure of the procedure and n a n c? **** blrth of ^ chlld and * 
to appropriately advise the patient Im- havin* a h < v s t o e c t ^ ^domei subse* 
munizing physicians from liability for q^ent to the birth of the child. In addition, 
negligence in this area would be contrary P l amt i f f seeb d a m a ? e s to compensate for 
to public policy, and we decline to do so. emotional P™ and s u f f e r i ng M wel1 M 
We simply hold such physicians to the emotional trauma d u r i n? and after the 
standard of care required of all members prepancy. Her final claim is for the antic-
of the same school of medicine in the fPated ®^ of rear^g ™i educating a 
community in which they practice. Such healthy child, 
a physician is answerable only if negli-
gence in the performance of the services t7' ^ A maJority of courts ^ have 
is established by proof.n examined the damages issue in the context 
In contrast acknowledging the cause of of a wron^ful ^^^ ms* °! ^ 
action for wrongful pregnancy and permit- have raled M most r e s u l t i n ? izm^ 
ting the plaintiffs to recover damages may be recovered except child-rearing ^ t s 
which they prove are the natural, probable, for a nomal ^ M^ Mi* Award* 
and direct consequences of professional ing these initial (non-child-reanng) damages 
negligence neither contravenes the policy is likewise congruous with our cases con-
of placing high value on human life!l nor c e r n i n? ^e ^ ^ T of d a m a g e s in ne?]i* 
necessarily encourages increased litigation £en t malpractice actions. Indeed, in /fe-
in this area. Indeed, since such claims are dorf v. Hicken,u we noted that damages 
generally limited to negligent and unsuc- which may be shown to follow as a proxi-
cessful sterilization procedures or negli- mate cause of the negligence include rea-
gent post-operative procedures and/or sonable charges for discovery and repair of 
counseling, it appears unlikely that there any resultant injur}' and monetary compen-
will be great proliferation of the same. At sation for mental anguish.25 Applying this 
any rate, "the potential for some increase general rule and principles involved in the 
in litigation cannot justify refusal to recog- majority view to the factual scenario of this 
nize a valid cause of action."a case, we now conclude that the following 
In view of the authority and rationale damages are recoverable, if proven: (l)any 
' noted above, we conclude that an action medical and hospital expenses incurred as a 
based on wrongful pregnancy is a valid result of the physician's negligence, includ-
cause of action in this state and therefore ing the costs of the initial unsuccessful 
answer the first certified question in the sterilization operation, prenatal care, child-
affirmative, birth, postnatal care, and any increased 
20. 241 Kan. at 411, 736 P2d al 939; see also 21 li 
Wilcynsti v. Goodman, 73 IiUppJd 51,63,29 
IlLDet 216, 225, 391 N.L2d 479, 488 (1979) 23. See, *f, Byrd v. Wesley Medical Center, 111 
(court will not allow tortious conduct by a
 Kan 215,221-24,699 P.2d 459,46S-47 (1985), 
medical practitioner to be totally "uncompensa.
 and ^ ci(ed ^ km Gt 332 S £ 2 d at 
WO; Hickman , Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869,871- ^ ^ ^
 M ^ 
72 (TexApp.1982) (It is in society s best interest 
to hold physicians to a standard of professional . 
competence and impose liability when they are ^ ^12 P2d 348 (Utah 1980). 
negligent in treating their patients."). 
25. l i at 355. 
21. See Johnston, 241 Kan. at 411, 736 P.2d at 
939. . 
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osts for a second sterilization operation if 
ibtained; (2) compensation for the physical 
md mental painI( and damage suffered by 
he mother as a result of the pregnancy 
md subsequent childbirth and as a result 
)f undergoing ^k sterilization operation(s) 
ind during a reasonable recovery period 
ifter ^ above; (3) wages necessarily lost 
by ^ mother and/or the father of the 
child related to the above; and (4) punitive 
damages, if applicable." 
[9) A more difficult issue is whether 
damages may also be recovered in wrong-
ful pregnancy actions for the ordinary 
costs of raising a normal and healthy chili 
The courts that have addressed this issue 
have adopted one of four theories of recov-
ery. 
A. No Recovery 
A few cases are cited as holding that 
parents have no right to recover any dam-
ages or expenses for hi performance of 
unsuccessful sterilization procedures be-
cause no damages resulted from the birth 
of a normal child.2* At least one court has 
viewed the state of Nevada as currently 
adhering to this "absolutist position." * 
ft Su taiffdly Cru: v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 
726 (Utah 1983); Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill 
Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216,1221 (Utah 1980). 
27. We note parenthetically that we join with 
those courts which have rejected the notion that 
in order to obtain damages in a wrongful preg-
nancy- cause of action, parents must have miti-
gated their damages by aborting or placing the 
child for adoption. See, t%., University of Aril 
v. Superior Court, 136 Aril 579,586 n. 5,667 
P i d 1294,1301 n. 5 (1983); Sherlock, 260 N.W. 
2d at 176; Morris, 746 P.2d at 189; Gore, 728 
S.WUd at 751-52; infra note 53. Such alterna-
tives are extreme and unreasonable. Cj. Ang-
los v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d 772, 
777 (Utah 1983) (mitigation of damages oper-
ates to prevent recovery for damages which 
could be avoided or minimized by reasonable 
means). 
28. Set, q „ Chrisiensm v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 
123,255 N.W. 620 (1934); Ball v. Mudg 64 
Washld 247,391 P.2d 201 (1964); Beardsty, 
650 P id at 290 (citing Shahetn v. Knitk 11 
Pa.D. k C. 41 (1957)); su also W. Prosscr k W. 
Keaton, Tons § 55, at 372 (5th ed. 1984) (early 
decisions denied recovery reasoning that bene-
fits of having healthy child outweighted detri-
B. Full Recovery 
The second view is that parents have a 
right to recover all the damages and all the 
expenses, including the costs of rearing the 
child, resulting from a failed sterilization 
procedure, Court's arguably adopting this 
view have based their decisions in part 
upon the fact that the right to limit pro-
creation through contraception is within a 
constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" 
and that to exempt the defendants from 
liability for the foreseeable consequences 
of a failed sterilization procedure would 
"infringe upon this fundamental right30 
Cases recognizing this view are at best a 
distinct minority and are viewed by some 
courts as nonexistent51 
C. The Benefits Rule 
A more substantial number but still a 
minority of courts recognize that an unin-
terrupted chain of causation is established 
between the failure of a sterilization proce-
dure due to a physician's negligence and 
the foreseeable consequences of the con-
ception, pregnancy, and birth of a normal 
29. Su Gere, 728 S.W2d at 742 (citing Spheres, 
102 Nev. 93,715 Pid 1076). Although denying 
recovery in Sickeres, the Nevada court recog-
nized: 
[I)f a physician or someone else is found to 
have contracted to prevent a pregnancy from 
occurring, certainly it was within the contem-
plation of the contracting parties that failure 
to carry out the process in the manner prom-
ised would result in an award, at least, of the 
costs of medical, surgical and hospital care 
associated with the failed surgery. In such a 
case damages could be awarded in accord-
ance with what was contemplated by the par-
ties at the time the contract was made. 
102 Nev. at 98,715 P.2d at 1079 (citation omit-
ted). 
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child,*2 and thus pregnancy actions give various reasons for 
it must be recognized that [rearing] costs not adopting the benefits rule. For clarity, 
are a direct financial injury to the par- we quote at length from that court's opin-
30. See Gore, 728 S.W.2d at 742-43, and cases 
cited therein; Beardsley, 650 P.2d at 291 (citing 
Cockrum v. Baumgrtner, 99 IlLApp.3d 271,273, 
5411LDec751,753,425N.L2d968,970(1981), 
rev'i 95111.2d 193,69 ULDec 168,447 N.L2d 
385, cert, denied, 464 US. 846,104 S.Ct. 149,78 
LEd.2d 139 (1983); su also Boone, 416 Soid at 
721 (California follows the full recover)' rule). 
31. Set, t j , Byri 237 Kan. at 218,699 P.2d at 
462-63; Morris, 746 P.2d at 185 n. 2; Miller, 231 
Va at 18* n. 2.343 S.W.2d at 306 n. 2. 
ents, no different in immediate effect 
than the medical expenses resulting from 
the wrongful, conception and birth of the 
child. Although public sentiment may 
recognize that to the vast majority of 
parents the long-term and enduring bene-
fits of parenthood outweigh the economic 
costs of rearing a healthy child, it would 
seem myopic to declare today that those 
benefits exceed the costs as a matter of 
law" 
Courts adopting this view, known as the 
"benefits rule," hold that parents have a 
right to recover all damages incurred and 
expenses resulting from the birth of an 
unplanned child, subject to having such 
amounts offset by the pecuniary and/or 
nonpecuniary benefits which parents will 
experience from their parental relationship 
with a normal and healthy child.u Section 
920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts at 
page 509 (1979) has been used to support 
this view. That section provides: 
When the defendant's tortious conduct 
has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his 
property and in so doing has conferred a 
special benefit to the interest of the 
plaintiff that was harmed, the value of 
the benefit conferred is considered in 
mitigation of damages, to the extent that 
this is equitable." 
One of the leading cases citing the Re-
statement and supporting the benefits rule 
is University of Arizona v. Superior 
Court* Therein, the Arizona Supreme 
Court noted that courts which prohibit the 
recovery of child-rearing costs (the "majori-
ty rule," infra pages 513-516) in wrongful 
31 Gore, 728 S.W.2d at 743. 
33. Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 175; set abo Univer-
sity of Aril, 136 Ariz, at 583-S5, 667 P.2d at 
1299-1300; FultonMaJb Hasp. Auik v. 
Craves, 252 Ga. 441,44344,314 S.Eid 653,656 
(1984) (Gregory, J., dissenting); Morris, 746 
P.2d at 192 (Opaia, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). 
34, See University of Art, 136 Ariz, at 584,667 
P.2d at 1299, and cases cited therein; Byri 237 
Kan. at 219-21,699 P i d at 463,465, and cases 
cited therein. 
ion: 
Some [majority rule] cases base their de-
cision on the speculative nature of the 
necessity to assess "such matters as the 
emotional affect [sic] of a birth on sib-
lings as well as parents, and the emotion-
al as well as pecuniary costs of raising 
an unplanned and, perhaps, an unwanted 
child in varying family environments." 
We think, however, that juries in tort 
cases are often required to assess just 
such intangible factors, both emotional 
and pecuniary, and see no reason why a 
new rule should be adopted for wrongful 
pregnancy cases. Another reason given 
for the strict [majority] view is the argu-
ment that the benefits which the parents 
will receive from having a normal, 
healthy child outweigh any loss which 
the parents might incur in rearing and 
educating that chili No doubt this is 
true in many cases, but we think it un-
realistic to assume that it is true in all 
cases. We can envision many situations 
in which for either financial or emotional 
reasons, or both, the parents are simply 
unable to handle another child and where 
it would be obvious that from either an 
economic or emotional perspective—or 
both-substantial damage has occurred. 
A third basis for the strict [majority] 
rule is the argument that the "injury is 
out of proportion to the culpability of the 
[wrongdoer]; and that the allowance of 
recovery would place too unreasonable a 
burden upon the [wrongdoer], since it 
would likely open the way for fraudulent 
35. The benefits rule has been criticized for fail-
ing to literally comply with the Restaicment 
view limiting the allowable offset to monetary 
("same interest") benefits resulting from the 
birth of the unplanned child, set, e*i, University 
of Aril, 136 Aril at 588,667 P.2d at 1303-04 
(Gordon, Vice CJ„ concurring and dissenting); 
Fulton-Ddalb, 252 Ga. 441,444,314 S.£.2d 653, 
655(1984). But su University of Aril, 136 Ariz. 
at 584 n. 4,677 Pid at 1299 n. 4 (response to 
criticism). . 
& 136 Ariz. 579,667 P.2d 1294. 
767 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 12 Utah 
claims.. . ." This, of course, is the hue 
and cry in many tort cases and in essence 
is no more than ti\t fear that some cases 
will be decided badly. Undoubtedly, the 
system will not decide each case correct-
ly in this field, just as it does not in any 
field, but here, as in other areas of tort 
law, we think it better to adopt a rule 
which will enable courts to strive for 
justice in all cases rather than to rely 
upon one which will ensure injustice in 
many. 
The final basis for the strict [majority] 
rule is the one which gives this court 
greater pause than any of the others. It 
is well put by the Illinois Supreme Court 
in Cockmm v. Baumgarlner.... The 
court used the following words to justify 
the denial of recover)7 of damages for the 
rearing and educating of '^ unplanned 
'There is no purpose to restating here 
the panoply of reasons which have been 
assiped by the courts which follow the 
majority rule. * ' ' In our view, how-
ever, its basic soundness lies in the sim-
ple proposition that a parent cannot be 
said to have been damaged by the birth 
and rearing of a normal, healthy 
child... . [I]t is a matter of universally-
shared emotion and sentiment that the 
intangible but all important, incalculable 
but invaluable 'benefits' of parenthood 
far outweigh any of the mere monetary 
burdens involved. Speaking legally, this 
may be deemed conclusively presumed 
by the fact that a prospective parent 
does not abort or subsequently place the 
'unwanted' child for adoption. On a 
more practical level, the validity of the 
principle may be tested simply by asking 
any parent the purchase price for that 
particular youngster. Since this is the 
rule of experience, it should be, and we 
therefore hold that it is, the appropriate 
rule of law." 
37. University of Arii, 136 Aril at 58243,667 
P id at 1297-98 (citations omitted). 
3 1 Responding in part to this argument, the 
Georgia Supreme Court noted: lW]e do not 
agree [with the Supreme'Court of Arizona] that 
We consider that on the grounds de-
scribed, the holding of a majority of jur-
isdictions that the costs of rearing a nor-
mal and healthy child cannot be recov-
ered as damages to ^ parents is to be 
preferred. One can, of course, in me-
chanical logic reach a different conclu-
sion, but only on the ground that human 
life and the state of parenthood are com-
pensible losses. In a proper hierarchy of 
values, the benefit of life should not be 
outweighed by the expense of supporting 
it Respect for life and the rights pro-
ceeding from it are the heart of our legal 
system and, broader still, our civiliza-
tion.37 
After noting this rationale, the Arizona 
court rejected ^ majority view in favor of 
^ benefits rule and concluded: 
In most cases we could join in the "uni-
versally shared emotion and sentiment" 
expressed by the majority [ru le ] . . . , but 
we do not believe we hold office to im-
pose our views of morality by deciding 
cases on the basis of personal emotion 
and sentiment, though we realize we can-
not and should not escape the effect of 
human characteristics shared by all man-
kind. However, we believe our function 
is to leave the emotion and sentiment to 
others and attempt to examine the prob-
lem with logic and by application of \h^ 
relevant principles of law. In this case, 
we believe that ^ [majority rule] is 
based upon an emotional premise and 
ignores logical considerations]58! While 
we recognize that in most cases a family 
can and will adjust to ^ birth of the 
child, even though they had not desired 
to have it, we must recognize also that 
there are cases where the birth of an 
unplanned child can cause serious emo-
tional or economic problems to the par-
ents . . . . 
In our view, the preferable rule is that 
followed by ^ courts which, although 
a strict application of principles of law will 
suffice to resolve the complicated questions that 
arise when the advance of science outstrips the 
development of ethical considerations,' h i 
ton-Ddalb, 252 Ga. at 443,314 S.L2d at 655. 
C.S. v, NIELSON Utah 5 1 3 
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permitting the trier of fact to consider .burden of having and rearing. Such tes-
both pecuniar)' and non-pecuniary ele-
ments of damage which pertain to the 
rearing and education of the child, also 
require it to consider the question of 
offsetting the pecuniary and non-pecuni-
ary benefits which the parents will re-
ceive from the parental relationship with 
the child. Some may fear that adoption 
of such a rule will permit juries to recog-
nize elements of damage which, because 
of our private philosophy or views of 
ethics, we, as judges, believe should not 
be recognized. We feel, however, that 
the consensus of a cross section of the 
community on such important issues is 
better and more accurately obtained 
from the verdict of a jury than from the 
decision of any particular group of that 
community. A jury verdict based on 
knowledge of all relevant circumstances 
is a better reflection of whether real 
damage exists in each case than can be 
obtained from use of any abstract, iron-
clad rule which some courts would adopt 
and apply regardless of the circumstanc-
es of the particular case. 
timony could be harmful if or when the 
child learns of it "We are not convinced 
that the effect on the child will be signifi-
cantly detrimental in every case, or even 
in most cases; ... we think the parents, 
not the courts, are the ones who must 
weigh the risk." 
In reaching our decision, we are influ-
enced greatly by what we perceive to be 
the uniform rules of damages for all tort 
cases. One of the basic principles of 
damage law is the concept that a wrong-
doer may be held liable for all damages 
which he may have caused and all costs 
which the victim may sustain as a result 
of the wrong... . 
We see no reason why ordinary dam-
age rules, applicable to all other tort 
cases, should not be applicable to this 
situation.* 
Other courts or judges agreeing with the 
Arizona view have also argued that (1) the 
benefits rule will more fully minimize sub-
There may be those who fear that the standard medical practice in the area of 
rale which we adopt will permit the sterilizationw and (2) allowing recovery for 
award of damages where no real injury the costs of rearing the child will best 
exists. We feel this danger is minimized protect the personal and constitutionally 
by giving weight and consideration in guaranteed privacy rights of procreation.41 
each case to the plaintiffs' reasons for Notwithstanding all of the above argu-
submitting to sterilization procedures, ments and rationales, jurisdictions adopting 
Such evidence is perhaps the most rele- the benefits rule remain a distinct minority, 
vant information on the question of 
whether the subsequent birth of a child 
actually constitutes damage to the par-
ents . . . . 
It may be argued also that the rule 
>n-D. Limited Damages View—The 
ty Rule 
Finally, of those courts that have ad 
which we adopt will have the unhappy dressed the issue of damages recoverable 
effect of creating situations in which par- in a wrongful pregnancy cause of action, a 
ents will testify to their feeling or opin- majority have held that the ordinary child-
ion that the child is "not worth" the rearing expenses for a healthy child cannot 
39. University of Arii, 136 Arii at 58446,667 
P.2d at 1298-1301 (footnotes and citations omit-
ted). 
40. See, tf, Sherlock 260 N.W.2d at 175; Mor-
ris, 746 P.2d at 192 (Opala, J. concurring and 
dissenting); Beordsley, 650 P.2d at 295 (Rose, 
CJ., concurring). 
41. See, LI, Morris, 746 P.2d at 191 (Opala, J., 
concurring and dissenting); see also Boone, 416 
So.2d at 724 (Faulbcr, J., concurring specially); 
Cockrum, 95 IlL2d at 207,69 Ill.Det at 175,447 
N £ 2 d at 392 (Clark, J., dissenting); Bearisley, 
650 P.2d at 295 (Rose, CJ., concurring); supra 
note 7. But see Cockrum, 95 Illid at 202,69 
HLDec at 173,447 N.L2d at 390 (constitutional 
decisions cited appear irrelevant to issue of 
whether damages are recoverable for child-rear-
ing costs). 
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be recovered.42 Refusal to permit recovery 
of child-rearing costs has been based upon 
various considerations. 
Some of the courts adopting this rule 
have based their rationale upon the specu-
lative nature of child-rearing damages.** 
Others have expressed concern for the 
mental and emotional health of the child 
who may someday learn that he or she was 
not wanted and was reared by funds forci-
bly obtained from another person or busi-
ness.44 Some courts have ruled that the 
injury of rearing the child is too remote 
from the negligence caused and allowing 
such recovery would place an unreasonable 
burden upon the defendant while offering a 
windfall to the parents, who may enjoy the 
benefits of parenthood at the defendant's 
expense. Such burden, these courts indi-
cate, is out of proportion to the culpability 
involved and will have a rampant and incon-
tinent effect45 Additionally, it has been 
noted that allowing such damages would 
likely impinge upon the availability and 
costs of sterilization surgery while creating 
the possibility of new and protracted litiga-
tion and fraudulent claims.44 Courts and 
judges have also concluded that the bene-
fits rule incorrectly applies the Restate-
ment principle which limits the damages 
41 Su supra note 23. 
43. See, L{., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 Aid 8,12 
(Del.1975); McKeman v. M a m , 102 Wash.2d 
411,419,6S7 P.2d 850,855 (1984). 
44. See, t | . , Byri 237 Kan. at 217, 699 ?2d at 
462, 465 ("The benefits rule makes it to the 
parents' advantage to emphasize their problems 
with the chili It attacks the family unit Un-
der the benefits rule, a problem arises as to who 
shall control the money recovered, the parents 
... or some special guardian to see that the 
money actually goes to the child,'" citations 
omitted.); Miller, 231 Va. at 185,343 S.Eid at 
306. 
45. Su, LI, Byri 237 Kan. at 221,699 ?2d at 
465 (citing McKeman, 102 Washed 411, 687 
Pid 850); Mdsley, 650 P.2d at 292. 
46. See, t§., University oj Aril, 136 Aril at 587, 
667 P.2d at 1302 (Gordon, Vice C I , concurring 
and dissenting); Byri 237 Kan. at 222,699 P.2d 
at 465; Bearisley, 650 P.2d at 292. 
47. See, e.|., University of Aril, 136 Aril, at 588-
89,667 P.2d at 1303-04 (Gordon, Vice CJ-. con-
that can be offset to monetary benefits 
resulting from the birth of the unplanned 
child.47 This conclusion has been sup-
ported by the observation that ^ benefits 
rule inconsistently allows rearing costs to 
be recovered without requiring considera-
tion of the parents' failure to attempt miti-
gation.a Lastly, many courts have ex-
pressed the opinion that parents cannot be 
damaged by the birth and rearing of a 
normal, healthy child since the joy, compan-
ionship, and affection which such a child 
can provide are benefits that will inevitably 
outweigh the costs of rearing that child.0 
The Wyoming Supreme Court expressed 
this view in Beardsley v. Wierdma:M 
We believe that the benefits of the 
birth of a healthy, normal child outweigh 
the expense of rearing a child. The bond 
of affection between child and parent, 
the pride in a child's achievement, and 
the comfort, counsel and society of a 
child are Incalculable benefits, which 
should not be measured by some mis-
placed attempt to put a specific dollar 
value on a child's life. 
The benefit or offset concept smacks 
of condemnation law, where the trier of 
fact determines the value of the land 
taken by the condemnor. The trier of 
curring and dissenting); Morris, 746 P.2d at 
18647; supra note 35. 
41 See, t i „ University of Aril, 136 Aril at 588, 
677 P.2d at 1303 (Gordon, Vice C I , concurring 
and dissenting). In response to this issue, one 
author has noted that parents should not be 
forced to mitigate damages by choosing abor-
tion or adoption. "They chose not to conceive a 
child, it \i quite a different situation to ask a 
couple, once a child has been conceived, to 
abort, or to put the child up for adoption, indi-
cating that if they failed to do either they would 
assume full responsibility of any and all costs ol 
that child. If parents arc confronted in such a 
situation with choices that they consider to be 
unenviable alternatives, they should not be pre-
cluded from recovering damages because they 
select the most desirable of these unpalatable 
choices." Cockrum, 95 Wild at 207,69 Ill.Dec 
at 175,447 N.L2d at 392 (Clark, J., dissenting); 
su abo supra note 27. 
49. See, * j , Boone, 416 SoJd at 722-23; Byri 
237 Kan. at 221,699 } l i at 465 (citing McKcr-
nan, 102 Wash.2d 411,687 ?2d 850). 
50. 650Pid288 . 
fact then determines the benefit that re-
sults to the land owner, which benefit is 
deducted from the original value to de-
termine the proper award. If the con-
cept of benefit or offset was applied to 
"wrongful birth" actions, we can con-
ceive of the ridiculous result that bene-
fits could be greater than damages, in 
which event someone could argue that 
the parents would owe something to the 
tort-feasors. We think that a child 
should not be viewed as a piece of prop-
erty, with fact finders first assessing the 
expense and damage incurred because of 
a child's life, then deducting the value of 
that child's life" 
Similarly, in Ternll v. Garcia,*1 the court 
reasoned: 
[A] strong case can be made that, at 
least in an urban society, the rearing of a 
child would not be a profitable undertak-
ing if considered from the economics 
alone. Nevertheless, ... the satisfac-
tion, joy and companionship which nor 
C.S. v. NIELSON 
Chen767 PJd5W(Uuh 1988) 
Utah 5 1 5 
If, as those jurisdictions allowing re-
covery for costs of raising an unplanned 
child agree, the benefits flowing from 
the life of an unplanned child must be 
allowed as an offset to the costs of rais-
ing the child, would we not then be re-
quired to allow, as an offset to ihe bene-
fits from the life of a child recoverable as 
damages in a wrongful death action, the 
costs of raising the child which will not 
be incurred because of the child's death? 
Would we not then be faced with the 
necessity of considering the death of the 
child in terms of the benefit bestowed 
upon the parents? This, in essence, is 
the heart of the matter before us. To 
consider the costs of raising an un-
planned child as an element of damages 
incurred, we are required to embrace the 
logical conclusion that the nonexistence 
of that child would be a benefit This we 
cannot do.M 
While we are not persuaded by all of 
these enumerated rationales in support of 
mal parents have in rearing a child make the majority rule, the reasons for denying 
such economic lass worthwhile. These rearing costs are more convincing than the 
intangible benefits, while impossible to reasons for "abstractly applying a rule not 
value in dollars and cents[J are undoubt- suited for the circumstances in this charac-
edly the things that make life worth-
while. Who can place a price tag on a 
child's smile or the parental pride in a 
child's achievement? Even if we consid-
er only the economic point of view, a 
child is some security for the parents' old 
age. Rather than attempt to value these 
intangible benefits, our courts have sim-
ply determined that public sentiment rec-
opines that these benefits to the parents 
outweigh their economic loss in rearing 
and educating a healthy, normal child. 
We see no compelling reason to change 
such rule at this time.u 
Finally, the Oklahoma Supreme Court re-
cently noted: 
51. Id. at 293. 
51 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tcx.Civipp.1973), cert it-
niti 415 VS. 927,94 S.CL 1434,39 LEdJd 484 
(1974). 
53. l i at 128 (citations omitted). 
54. Morris, 746 P.2d at 18748 (footnote omit-
ted). 
ter of case." M 
Moreover, we find persuasive the state-
ment of the Washington Supreme Court 
that the benefits rule cannot be applied 
because 
it is impossible to establish with reason-
able certainty whether the birth of a 
particular healthy, normal child damaged 
its parents. Perhaps the costs of rearing 
and educating a child could be deter-
mined through use of actuarial tables or 
similar economic information. But 
whether these costs are outweighed by 
•the emotional benefits which will be con-
ferred by that child cannot be calculated. 
The child may turn out to be loving, 
55. Cockrum, 95 UL2d at 203,69 Iil.Dec. at 173, 
447 N.EJd at 390. But su Acculo^ Inc. v. 
Petersen, 692 P.2d 728, 731 (Utah 1984) (all 
damages, whether special or general, which are 
causally connected to a party's tortious actions 
are generally recoverable). 
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obedient and attentive, or hostile, unruly and we acknowledge it In wrongful preg-
and callous. The child may grow up to nancy actions, the projected costs of rear-
be President of the United States, or to ing a normal, healthy child may not be 
be an infamous criminal. In short, it is recovered, 
impossible to tell, at an early stage in the
 0ur decision k limited to ^ mm 
child's life, whether its parents have sus- ^
 presented) and M suchf we do not 
tained a net loss or net gain."
 address other ^m and questions which 
rhis rationale has also been adopted by the
 might be raised in this sensitive area of the 
Delaware Supreme Court, which noted: law.*8 
First, as to the legal concept, it is a ^
 parties are to ^ Mr m m^ 
settled Delaware law that recovery may 
not be had for damages which are specu- STEWART, J., concurs. 
lative or conjectural. And that applies to
 mmTTMI , .. , . , Ll A .. ; , DURHAM, Justice concurring and 
any attempt to measure the value of a 
human life against its cost A child is g 
bora-how can it be said within the am- In ™ w of *e authorities and rationale 
bit of legal predictability that the mone- P r e s e n t e d ty ^  maJority °P inion>' m ™ 
tary cost of that life is worth more than *at an action based on wron^ul pregnan-
its value? We recognize that a few <7 is a vaM m& of action in te state: 
courts, approaching the problem in clini- However, I do not agree with the majori-
cal terms, have applied a "balancing ty's limitation on recoverable damages. In-
test" which, presumably, permits a jury stead> I w o u W ho!d $iti d a m a g e s shoul(i be 
to say that a life has been weighed and assessed under a "benefits rule" analysis, 
found wanting and thus the parents have on a case-by-case basis, to determine the 
been "damaged." We respect the efforts extent of any substantial negative impact 
of other [cjourts to provide a remedy suffered by plaintiff and her family result 
under the circumstances but it seems to inS fr°m a subsequent childbirth. This ap-
us that that kind of judgment, if appro proach would promote justice by permitting 
priate at all in an American Court of law, consideration of the impact "accruing to 
might be applied at the end of a life, parents in differing circumstances" of de-
after it has been lived and when the facts fendants' negligence. Boone v. Mullen-
can be identified. But, in our view, any tore, 415 So.2d 718,726 (Ala.1982) (Faulk-
attempt to apply it at birth can only be ner, J., specially concurring), 
an exercise in prophesy, an undertaking [ find the majority opinion's rationale for 
not within the specialty ol our fact-find- limiting damages to be unpersuasive given 
ers<
 the arguments favoring the "benefits 
Having thus considered the views and rule." I also disagree with the majority's 
arguments advanced in support of each of conclusion that damages to a parent from 
the recovery approaches, and notwithstand- raising a child to majority are unascertaina-
ing the positions taken by Justices Durham ble. In making these assertions, the major-
and Zimmerman which would broaden the ity ignores the realities of tiit circumstanc-
measure of damages to include the costs of es in which this kind of case tends to arise, 
rearing the child, the Court concludes that See generally Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. 
the majority rule applies in this jurisdiction, App.2d 303,59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (Cal.Ct App. 
56. McKernan, 102 Wash.2d at 419-20,687 P.2d 57. Coleman, 349 A.2d at 12 (footnotes and du-
al 855 (citations omitted); cf. Atkin, Wright & tions omitted); see also Miller, 231 Va. 187,343 
Miles v. Mountain States Tel, 709 P.2d 330,336 $.L2d at 306, and casts cited therein; James G., 
(Utah 1985) (There ... must be evidence that 332 $.E.2d at 878. 
rises above speculation and provides a reason-
abk, even though not necessarily precise, csti- ^ ^ ^
 4,4 ^ „ 1R 
mate of damages.); Hi(hknd Const. Co. v. Un-
ion Pacific ML Co., 643 H i 1042.1045 (Utah 
1984) ("[Djamage must be established by sub-
stantial evidence and not by conjecture"). 
C.S. v. NIELSON Utah 517 
OttuWrii 504 (Utah I Ml) 
1967) (family with nine children and of lim- sicians should not be guarantors of a steri-
ited financial means sought to prevent fur- lization procedure's success. See i i The 
tier diminution of family resources); Stills issue is usually not negligence in the per-
il. Gratton, 55 Cal.App.3d 698, 127 Cal. formance of a sterilization procedure or 
Rptr. 652 (Cal.CLApp.1976) (unmarried, contraceptive treatment, but rather a fail-
unemployed, part-time art student with ure to inform the patient about pregnancy 
self-described emotional problems fright- risks remaining after the procedure or the 
end at prospect of having a child); Sher- treatment In cases where sterilization is 
lock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.Wid 169 intentionally sought to avoid a specific 
(Minn.1977) (following birth of seventh harm and the physician in question is fully 
child, parents sought to ensure that their informed about the harm to be avoided and 
family would grow no larger); Hartke v. then fails to take reasonable measures to 
McKelmy, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.CCir.), cert
 avert tnat harai w h a it is foreseeable, that 
denied, 464 U.S. 983, 104 S.Ct 425, 78
 physician should ^ m in damages. 
LEd.2<] 360 (1983) (plaintiff with history of
 m vieff j , consistent ^ ^ majority's 
gynecological and pregnancy-related emo-
 decision M « ^ physician who m m ® 
tional problems); Ock v. Borrellx, 187
 the responsMity for a sterilization proce-
Conn. 253,445 A.2d 883 (1982) (following
 im at ^ ^ of a patient ^ ^ a 
births of two children with orthopedic de-
 p r of e s s j o n a] duty to render appropriate ser-
fects, plaintiff with history of miscarriage ^ y ^
 teting and advice regarding 
and ovanan surgery sought to prevent sub- ^
 procedure| exercisiflg ^ im stan. 
sequent pregnancy); Unmrnty of Ariz.
 M o i m i a p p | i c a b ] e tootemembers of 
Health Sciences Center v. Superior the medical profession in the community.'" 
Court, 136 Ariz. 579,667 P.2d 1294 (1983)
 Se( {i 
(having three children, plaintiffs sought to 
limit family size for 'financial reasons); ^ ^ i l W^ fo ! lows M a ^ 
Jones v. Malinowskt, 299 Md. 257, 473 h ? e n t P**0™""* of M dut>' w k h * 
A.2d 429 (1984) (economic factors motivate sults 'm an avoidable- foreseeab]e W 
plaintiffs to limit family size after having mi •* compensable in damages. Any 
three children, each born with complica- artificial limitation on the damages recover-
tions); see also Tropp v. Scarf, 31 Mich. able would work to immunize the tort-fea-
App. 240,187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (plaintiffs sor fr0IT1 the economic consequences of his 
of limited economic means, using oral con- or her n e? l if«n t condurt and to shift &<** 
Lraceptives to limit family size, receive consequences to the innocent victim. Such 
tranquilizers instead of birth control pills). Jadiciall>' ^ P 0 ^ nmm^'is contrar>' to 
Furthermore, I find the majority's use of a ^ $* compensatory and the deterrent 
limited damages rule inconsistent with fun- ?oa's °' ^ ^w' 
damental principles of tort law. Generally, Recovery for child-rearing costs where a 
when breach of a legally recognized duty negligently performed sterilization has a 
arises, the tort-feasor is liable in damages, substantial negative impact on the family is 
See Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d j n the interest of "greater justice." See 
728,731 (Utah 1984). it is axiomatic that Hartke, 707 Fid at 1552. Some courts 
when the principles of tort law are not have advanced the notion that recovery of 
followed, the salutory effect of those prin- child-rearing costs offends a fundamental 
ciples on the standard of care in the com- ^^ ^^ that the birth of a child is 
munity may be diminished. See Johnston
 a ] f f a v s a benefit See, e.g., Cockrum v. 
v. Elkins, 241 Kan. 407,411,736 Pid 935, Baumgartner, 95 I11.2d 193, 69 IlLDec 
939
 <1987)- 168,447 N.E.2d 385, cert denied, 464 U.S. 
It is true, as the majority observes, that 846,104 S.Ct 149,78 LEd.2d 139 (1983) 
in an action for wrongful pregnancy, "fail- (public policy considerations dictate that a 
ore of the physician to achieve success does healthy child's birth is a benefit to parents); 
not automatically indicate negligence." Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 
/oAruton, 736 P.2d at 939. Moreover, phy- (Wyo.1982) (bond of affection between par-
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and child should not be measured by 
ie misplaced attempt to assess a dollar 
le on child's life); Public Health Trust 
Irom, 388 So.2d 1084 (FkDistCLApp. 
0) (requiring negligent physician to pay 
h costs would impose an unreasonable 
den on the tort-feasor because the costs 
•e out of proportion to the culpability), 
ivever, as the majority observes, permit-
5 recovery of damages which are proven 
>e the "natural, probable and direct con-
uence of professional negligence ... 
is not contravene the policy of placing a 
h value on human life." Johnston, 736 
d at 939; see also University of Aril, 
' P.2d.at 1298-99 (cases should not be 
:ided on sentiment alone-many situa-
as exist where for economic or emotional 
sons or both, it is obvious that recovera-
damage has occurred); Ochs, 445 A.2d 
885-86 (no inconsistency with public poli-
that parental pleasure softens but does 
t eradicate economic reality). 
Jurisdictions which recognize wrongful 
sgnancy as a cause of action and allow 
:overy for child-rearing costs premise 
mages on the fact that a resultant birth 
ly cause hardship to family members due 
the diminution of family resources rath-
than the birth itself. See, e.g., Univem-
of Ariz., 667 P.2d at 1294; Stills, 55 
il.App.3dat698.127Cal.Rptr.652; Ochs, 
5 A.2d at 883; Malinowski, 473 A.2d at 
3; Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 173. As the 
aryland Supreme Court succinctly sum-
arized: "Parents seek [these] damages, 
)t because they do not love and want to 
>ep the unplanned child, but because the 
rect, foreseeable and natural consc-
iences of the physician's negligence has 
ic] forced burdens upon [the parents] 
hich they sought to avoid. . . by submit-
ng to sterilization." Malinowski, 473 
.2d at 436. 
In this light, recovery for child-rearing 
spenses is, in my view, appropriate when 
negligently caused pregnancy forces 
pon parents substantial economic, emo-
onal, or physical hardships which they 
ought to avoid. See, e.g., i i ; University 
fAriz, 667 P.2d at 1300-01; Ochs, 445 
i.2d at 883-84; Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1553-
4 (applying District of Columbia law). 
But see Flowers v. District of Columbia, 
478 A.2d 1073 (App.DX.1984) (adopting the 
limited damages rule). Regarding the ap-
propriateness of a recovery for child-rear-
ing expenses resulting from pregnancy, the 
Arizona Supreme Court stated: "[I]n most 
cases, the family can and will adjust to the 
birth of a child, even though they had not 
desired to have it(; however,] we must 
recognize ... that there are cases where 
the birth of an unplanned child can cause 
serious emotional or economic problems to 
the parents." University of Ariz., 667 
P.2d at 1299. The following is illustrative 
of this concept 
A couple privileged to be bringing home 
the combined income of a dual profes-
sional household may well be able to 
sustain and cherish an unexpected child. 
But I am not sure the child's smile would 
be the most memorable characteristic to 
an indigent couple, where the husband 
underwent a vasectomy or the wife un-
derwent a sterilization procedure, not be-
cause they did not desire a child, but 
rather because they faced the stark real-
ization that they could not afford to feed 
an additional person, much less clothe, 
educate and support a child when that 
couple had trouble supporting one anoth-
er. The choice is not always giving up 
personal amenities in order to buy a gift 
for the baby; the choice may only be to 
stretch necessities beyond the breaking 
point to provide for a child that the cou-
ple had purposely set out to avoid hav-
ing. 
Cockrum, 69 Iil.Dec. at 168, 177, 447 
N.E,2d 385,394 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
The foreseeable injury associated with a 
negligently caused pregnancy need not be 
solely economic. There are "many situa-
tions in which for either financial or emo-
tional reasons, or both, the parents are 
simply unable to handle another child and 
where it would be obvious that from either 
an economic or emotional perspective—or 
both—substantial damage has occurred." 
University of Ariz., 667 P.2d at 1298; see 
also Ochs, 445 A.2d at 886. It is logical, 
therefore, that where pregnancy may cause 
substantia! emotional, psychological, or 
C.S. v. NIELSON 
Clteu767Pid504(Uuk!9tt) 
physical stress to family resources, the re- parents, 
suiting injury merits compensation. In 
these cases, compensation for child-rearing 
expenses will be appropriate. 
I fully agree that a healthy child's birth 
does, in the usual circumstance, confer 
many benefits upon its family. However, 
these benefits may in a very real sense be 
offset by hardships that the parents sought 
to avoid Thus, the extent of any resulting 
injury will vary depending on the particular 
family's circumstances and expectations. 
See Cockrum, 69 Iil.Dec. at 174,447 N.E. 
2d at 391 (Clark, J., dissenting). In my 
view, parental planning of familial re-
sources, motivated by their aspirations for 
their then-existing children's futures, is an 
important consideration. It is conceivable 
that some parents may limit their family 
size in order to provide their children with 
specific opportunities for travel or edu-
cation. Therefore, the most relevant con-
sideration for ascertaining actual injury is 
the parents' motivation for seeking the 
sterilization procedure. See Malinowski, 
473 A.2d at 434; see also Hartke, 707 F.2d 
at 1553; Troppi 187 N.W.2d at 518-19 
(consequences of birth from failure of con-
traceptives contingent on the purposes and 
circumstances of parents-comparing un-
married female college student with honey-
mooning newlyweds). 
After consideration of parental motiva-
tions for avoiding pregnancy, it is conceiva-
ble that many wrongful pregnancy cases 
will be adequately remedied by the majori-
ty rule, However, it is just as conceivable 
that there are many cases wherein preg-
nancy and birth will constitute a substan-
tial negative impact on the family. In 
these cases, the limited damages rule ad-
vanced by the majority would not work an 
equitable result 
In determining whether child-rearing ex-
penses are appropriate in a given case, the 
extent of the negative impact on the family 
must be measured. 
We tend to agree that a factfinder should 
place great weight on a couple's reason 
Utah 519 
[The] reason for departing 
from the usual view that childrearing is a 
positive experience is in effect a calcula-
tion of the way in which they anticipate 
the costs of childbirth to outweigh the 
benefits. That calculation, untainted by 
bitterness and greed, or by a sense of 
duty to a child the parents have brought 
into the world, is usually the best avail-
able evidence of the extent to which the 
[childbirth] has in fact been an injury to 
them. 
Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1555. 
Reflecting these sentiments, the .Arizona 
Supreme Court stated: 
For example, where the parent sought 
sterilization in order to avoid the danger 
of genetic defect, the jury could easily 
find that the uneventful birth of a 
healthy, non-defective child was a bless-
ing rather than a "damage." [In this 
light] such evidence should be admissi-
ble, and the rule which we adopt will 
allow the jury to learn all the factors 
relevant to the determination of whether 
there has been any real damage and, if 
so, how much. 
University of Am., 667 P.2d at 1300. 
Thus, in view of the realities in which 
these cases arise, a case-by-case application 
of a "benefits rule" analysis is not merely 
necessary, but is required. The impact of a 
negligently caused prepancy may differ 
dramatically according to a particular fami-
ly's circumstances and aspirations. It 
must be emphasized that it is impossible to 
articulate a mechanistic test, as opposed to 
identifying an analytic approach. For this 
and the other reasons discussed above, a 
case-by-case approach to the determination 
of damages is the most practical. 
The majority opinion maintains that dam-
ages are unascertainable because "it is im-
possible to tell, at an early stage in the 
child's life, whether its parents have sus-
tained a net loss or net gain." McKernan 
v. Aasheim, 102 Wash.2d 411, 420, 687 
P.2d 850,855 (1984). To support this asser-
tion, the majority utilizes \i\e rationale that 
for undergoing sterilization in deciding- parents are either benefited or burdened by 
whether the subsequent birth of a child, their child's future behavior, and because it 
on balance, constitutes damage to the is too speculative to determine this at a 
) Utah m PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
d's birth, offset is impracticable. See that they elected sterilization for some im-
I disagree. Child-rearing costs are not portant economic, personal, or therapeutic 
speculative to deny their recovery un- reason and that \h^ subsequent childbirth 
settled tort principles. Malinowski, has resulted in the substantial harm the 
I A.2d at 436. parent sought to avoid by submitting to the 
rVe have held on other occasions that procedure. See, e.j., Flowers, 478 A.2d at 
nages may be recovered even when they 1081 (Ferren, J , dissenting);- Ochs, 445 
juire juries to consider intangible values. A.2d at 884; Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 173. 
e, eg., Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 In order to discredit that assertion,, the 
tah 1982) (wrongful death); Nelson v. defending physician could inquire into ^ 
cobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) (alien- plaintiffs' financial situation and motives 
ion of affection). Moreover, in Bastian via discovery and cross-examination. 
King, 661 P.2d 953 (Utah 1983), this Flowers, 478 ! 2 d at 1081 (Ferren, J, dis-
)urt stated: senting). For example, the "jury should be 
[I]t is generally recognized that some allowed to infer . . . that a person of means 
degree of uncertainty in the evidence of could not credibly give economic reasons as 
damages will not suffice to relieve a de- the sole motive for sterilization." Ii 
fendant from recompensing a wronged ^ i , as Judge Ferren wrote when dis-
plaintiff. As long as there is some ra- senting in flown: 
tional basis for a damage award, it is \}it ^ ^ f ^ ffiUgt present ^ 
wrongdoer who must assume the risk of ^ ^ m o{ ^ M ^ ^ 
some uncertainty. Where there is evi- ^ ^
 m{s ^ ^ ^ ^ 
dence of the fact of damage, a defendant ^ ^ ^ ^
 To ^ ^ 
may not escape liability because the ^
 the$e must k ^ Qn ^ 
amountofdamagecannotbeprovedwith ^ ^
 not ^ ^ ^ 
Pr e c i s l o n* The physician may rebut that presents 
\i at 956 (citations omitted).
 tion by showing ^ [clairned] damages 
Furthermore, the assertion that child- are not as great as alleged because cer-
rearing costs are too speculative to be re- tain kinds oi proposed expenses should 
covered is inconsistent with the theory of not be considered necessary [in light of 
damages in this particular cause of action.. the evidence presented] (e.g. private 
In wrongful pregnancy, damages are for schools, music lessons) and also because 
"the diminution in the family [resources] the family can anticipate some calculable 
that necessarily resulted in a hardship to financial benefits from the child.... 
the other members of the family." Sher- However, evidence of emotional benefit 
lock, 260 N.W.2d at 173. I fail to see why ("satisfaction, love, joy, and pride"H* 
economic data about family resources distinguished from financial benefit-
would be unavailable or unhelpful in these cannot be introduced to offset [any] fr 
cases
- nancial injury. In [these c a s e s ] . . . evi-
I agree that ^ offset of financial costs dence tha t . . . [the] child can be expected 
by the intangible benefits conferred on a to provide emotional benefit is irrelevant, 
family by a child may in some cases be and the majority's concern about deni-
unrealistic. See Flown, 478 A.2d at 1081 grating the child's value as a human 
(Ferren, J., dissenting). However, instead being ... is misplaced. 
of prohibiting such damages altogether, I 473 A.2d at 1081 (citations omitted). The 
would allow recovery on a case-by-case ba- irrelevance of intangible emotional benefits 
sis under what I believe is a proper applica-
 in ^ 0f ftis nature j s underscored by 
tion of ^ benefits rule, using a standard ^ ^ y '^mi 'm ^ m i juries to 
of ^'substantial negative impact to the fami- " ^
 parents of an unpiaixned-for (but 
V' healthy) child with the economic value of 
First, the plaintiffs would have to demon- the child's future life in the abstract Not-
state by a preponderance of the evidence withstanding Justice Zimmerman's charac-
C.S. v. NIELSON Utah 5 2 1 
Cltcti767Pid504{Dubl9«) 
terization of this approach as an "unadul- been recognized in the vast majority of 
terated" benefits rule for measuring dam- jurisdictions. 1 also agree that the Utah 
ages, I believe that it would in practical Wrongful Life Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-
application deprive most victims of this 11-23 to -25 (1987) does not bar this cause 
kind of tort of any recovery. Jurors will of action. See Note, Wrongful Birth and 
instead bring their subjective, philo- Wrongful Life: Analysis of the Causes of 
sophical, moral, and religious beliefs to the Action and the Impact of Utah's Statu-
determination of the dollar value of a tory Breakwater, 1984 Utah LRev. 833, 
it- child's life, unrelated to any actual facts 859. For that reason, we can postpone 
about the child or the life in question. I do reaching the constitutionality of that act to 
not think that this is "fact finding" in any another day. See generally i i at 862-63. 
conventional sense, nor do I think that any ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ m Q{ 
jury is likely to find a "child's life" to be ^ a g e s available in such actions, I do not 
less valuable than any economic cost, bur- ^ ^ ^ ^
 of ^ Chie{ Jusfe 
den, hardship, or sacrifice imposed upon its
 or WJU, that of Justice Durham. Because 
family. The net result, 1 believe, would be ^ ^ ^ ^
 kK ^ m])^{). 
to permit a cause of action in these cases,
 hM^mi fm u y otkr ma!prac. 
but preclude any reahstic likelihood of re- ^
 dm< j m m ^ to ^ some 
cover
'^ sort of truncated damages remedy as both 
The majority rule of recovery is not well the Chief Justice and Justice Durham pro-
suited for the diverse contexts and circum- p^e. See ii, 1984 Utah LRev. at 854-56. 
stances that arise in wrongful prepancy The Chief Justice would limit damages by 
cases. Using a benefits rule analysis, on a excluding any consideration of the costs of 
case-by-case basis, with a standard of "sub- raising the child, despite the fact that these 
stantial negative impact," would provide damages are clearly foreseeable. I think 
fairness in cases where the majority rule the recoverable damages should include all 
will not The majority rule in effect says reasonably foreseeable harms, including 
to some families burdened by the harm and the costs of raising the child. As nearly as 
struggle which some unwanted pregnan- \
 m determine, Justice Durham would 
cies bring that they have no remedy despite p ^ recovery of child-rearing costs in 
the hardship and stress they may be con-
 some circumstances, but would amend 
demned to undergo. Moreover, to the ex-
 what is generally referred to as the "bene-
tent that physicians are encouraged by a fits rule" by not permitting the jury to 
liability rule to maintain a high standard of consider counterbalancing benefits that the 
care in this area of practice, the limited
 parents mjght derive from bearing and 
recovery rule dilutes the liability rule's de- raising the child. I would adopt the una-
terrent effect Therefore, I dissent from dulterated "benefits rule" for measuring 
the majority's holding on limited recovery, damages, which most closely approximates 
the general damages rule that if the tort-
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring feasor has conferred benefits as well as 
and dissenting): detriments on the plaintiff, the benefits and 
I agree with much of the majority opin- detriments must be netted out in any 
ion; however, I depart from both the Chief award. Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Justice and Justice Durham on the damage § 920 (1979); 22 AmJur.2d Damages § 551 
measure. For that reason, I write. (1988). 
First, I want to make it clear that I agree The various possible rules and the justifi-
with the majority of the members of the cations for adopting the straight benefits 
Court that a tort action for wrongful preg- rule rather than the rules advanced by the 
nancy should be recognized in Utah and Chief Justice and Justice Durham are de-
that such an action can arise from the birth scribed persuasively by the Arizona Su-
of a healthy child. As the opinion of the preme Court in University of Arizona 
Chief Justice notes, this cause of action has Health Sciences Center v. Superior CL, 
ADDENDUM B 
HOSPITAL CENTER 
M R ? ^ o o 9 / ^ :/?'•> rn7TYY , 
STATELY Oi^  UNAEISTXNPING * 
AND CONSENT,,TO STERILIZATION OPERATION 
I have a_sked for and received information concerning s t e r i l i z a t i o n from 
£V H^V f"ft cu: h. A » a member of the Medical Staf f of the McKay-Dee 
Hospital Center. I was to ld that I could decide not to be s t e r i l i z e d . I f I 
decide not to be s t e r i l i z e d , my decision w i l l not a f fec t my r i g h t to future care 
or treatment. 
I understand the nature, purpose, e f fec t s , r i s k s , benefits and alternat ives 
to an operation for the purpose of s t e r i l i z a t i o n . I understand that the s t e r i l i z a -
t ion must be considered permanent and not revers ib le . I have decided that I do 
not want to become pregnant or bear ch i l d ren , but understand that the results from 
th is procedure cannot be guaranteed. 
I was to ld about those temporary methods of b i r t h control that are available 
and could be provided to ne which w i l l al low me to bear a ch i ld in the fu ture. I 
have rejected these al ternat ives and chosen to be s t e r i l i z e d . 
j
 r I understand that I w i l l be s t e r i l i z e d by an operation known as & ^<I&LXJS.<XO 
\yjjl-u'' j//#gjtrs-n The discomforts, r isks and benefits associated with the 
operation have been explained to re. A l l my questions have been answered to my 
sa t i s fac t i on . 
I , \A'iS C ' ^ o b > 3 \ c? > hereby consent of my own free w i l l to be 
s t e r i l i z e d ay fcr. rry> r\1g^jtl { ^ , ^ .D. and/cr associates end assistants 
of his/her choice to perform the fo l lowing operation upon me at the McKay-Dee 
Hospital Center ( c i r c le one) laparoscopic tubal coagulat ion, pomercy tubal l i g a t i o n , 
salpingectomy, hulka c l i p . 
/.kite 
Patient Signature 
Si gnature of Witness *r 
(IF AN INTERPRETER IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE STERILIZED) 
I have translated the information and advice presented orally to the individual to 
be sterilized by the person obtaining this consent. I have also read to 
the consent form in language and 
explained its contents. To the best of my knowledge and belief, she understood 
this explanation. 
Interpreter Date 
Form # 686-A8-5/84R-596 
ADDENDUM C 
GARY D. STOTT (A313 0) 
CURTIS J. DRAKE (A0910) 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant R. H. McMaster, M.D, 
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (8 01) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE LITTLE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. H. McMASTER and McKAY DEE 
HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. CV-221988 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Robert 
H. McMaster, M.D. came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Second District Judge, on January 
29, 1990 at the hour of 11:00 a.m. Plaintiff was represented 
by Mary C. Corporon, Esq. and defendant McMaster by Curtis J. 
Drake, Esq. The Court had reviewed the memoranda filed by 
counsel for the parties and heard oral argument from counsel. 
Based upon the record herein and good cause appearing for 
defendant's Motion, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of defendant Robert H. McMaster, M.D. is granted. 
Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Each party 
shall bear his or her own costs. 
DATED this 1 ^  day of fk brv^i vj , 1990, 
BY THE COURT: 
i 
HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR 
Second District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
on this 31
 A-jj- day of January, 1990, to the following counsel 
of record: 
Mary C. Corporon, Esq. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
fWU.~ L ni.iVw;,! 
LITTLE01/CJD 
#9828-012 
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ADDENDUM D 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
ALICE LITTLE, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF DR. STEVEN R. SHIRTS 
-vs-
R. H. McMASTER and McKAY Civil No. CV-221988 
DEE HOSPITAL, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, DR. STEVEN R. SHIRTS, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a physician duly licensed to practice medicine in 
the State of Utah and am practicing in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. I have hospital privileges at Pioneer Valley Hospital and 
practice exclusively in the field of obstetrics and gynecology. 
I am board certified with the American Board of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology. 
2. I have reviewed the medical records of the plaintiff to 
the above-capticmed matter, Alice Little, pertaining to her 
pregnancy which resulted in the birth of twins on May 2, 19 85. 
In that pregnancy she was assisted by the defendant above-named, 
Dr. R. H. McMaster. The delivery by Caesarean Section and a 
tubal ligation were performed by Dr. R. H. McMaster at the 
defendant McKay Dee Hospital. 
3. I have reviewed the document entitled "Statement of 
Understanding and Consent to Sterilization Operation" signed by 
Alice Little, which is undated. A true and correct copy of this 
statement is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference 
as "Exhibit A." 
4. In my opinion, the "Statement of Understanding and 
Consent to Sterilization Operation" would be and is unclear to 
the average layman, in that it states that the operation "must be 
considered permanent and not reversible . . .", but in that it 
also states that the results from this procedure "cannot be 
guaranteed." In my opinion, the phrase and statement that the 
result of this procedure "cannot be guaranteed" is not adequate 
to inform the patient that she may become pregnant after 
performance of this procedure. 
5. In my opinion, the statistical probability that Alice 
Little would become pregnant after performance of a tubal 
ligation, performed immediately post-Caesarean, would be 
approximately 1 in 125. These odds would increase, in favor of 
permanent sterilization, to approximately 1 in 300 if 
sterilization were performed six weeks or more post-delivery. In 
my opinion, any patient contemplating a tubal ligation should be 
informed of those options and statistics and the risks of 
becoming pregnant in spite of the surgery. 
6. Any patient consenting to any surgery, including a 
2 
sterilization operation post-Caesarean, as was done in this case, 
should be requested to sign a statement of understanding and 
consent to sterilization before any type of anesthesia or pre-
operative medication is administered. If Alice Little signed the 
"Statement of Understanding and Consent to Sterilization 
Operation" after receiving any kind of narcotic within the one or 
two hours prior, then she would not have been competent to sign a 
consent to the surgery, even though she may have been conscious. 
7. In my review of the medical records, I did not note any 
indication that Dr. McMaster had taken the time to discuss the 
risks of the performance of the sterilization procedure with his 
patient, Alice Little, including the risk that she may still 
become pregnant, either in his records and notes of office visits 
with Alice Little, in the hospital prior to the surgeries or at 
any time prior to the performance of the tubal ligation. 
8. In my opinion, the defendant, McKay Dee Hospital, is 
also responsible to advise its surgery patients of substantial 
and significant risks which may result from surgery performed in 
their hospital. In my opinion, the risk of becoming pregnant 
after performance of tubal ligation surgery is a substantial and 
significant risk. It appears that the obtaining of Alice 
Little's signature on the "consent" was done at the last minute. 
The form is undated and untimed, and it is not even completely 
filled in, in that the patient apparently did not understand 
exactly what procedure was about to be performed on her because 
she did not cirle the appropriate procedure where indicated. 
Therefore, I question whether Alice Little was given time to read 
the form prior to signing it, nor do I believe that she had an 
3 
understanding of the procedure to be performed. I question if 
the person obtaining her signature took the time to explain to 
her what she was signing. Certainly, the hospital employee 
securing the signature did not have the form completed 
satisfactorily. 
9. In my opinion, the defendants, R. H. McMaster and McKay 
Dee Hospital, fell below the standard of care of physicians 
practicing in the State of Utah and/or hospitals in the State of 
Utah in their treatment of Alice Little, in failing to advise 
Alice Little of substantial and serious risks of her tubal 
ligation surgery performed in 1985, in failing to clearly advise 
her that she might become pregnant after the surgery. 
/Aio^ CI. J^<h^ ^ 
DR. STEVEN R. SHIRTS 
Affiant 
, / 
ON THE y V day of April, 1989, personally appeared before 
me, the undersigned notary, Dr. Steven R. Shirts, the signer of 
the foregoing Affidavit, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
signed the same voluntarily and for its stated purpose. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of 
Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that 
I caused the foregoing Affidavit of Dr. Steven R. Shirts to be 
served upon defendants by placing a true and correct copy of the 
same in an envelope addressed to: 
GARY D. STOTT 
Attorney for Defendant McMaster 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
DAVID B. ERICKSON 
Attorney for Defendant McKay Dee 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage pre-
paid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah 
on the ___r^_ day of J t' ' , , 1989. 
Secretary 
5 
U T T l € r A L 1 C * , c t BMMcKAY-DEE 
1 W ^ ] r ^ o ? i : 7 Y Ff lP HOSPITAL CENTER 
AND CONSENT.TO STERILIZA^ON OPERATION 
I have asked for and received information concerning s t e r i l i z a t i o n from 
D r f)y r h o o X i A . » a member of the Medical Staf f of the McKay-Dee 
Hospital Center. I was to ld that I could decide not to be s t e r i l i z e d . I f I 
decide not to be s t e r i l i z e d , my decision w i l l not a f fec t my r i gh t to future care 
or treatment, 
I understand the nature, purpose, e f fec ts , r i s k s , benefits and al ternat ives 
to an operation for the purpose of s t e r i l i z a t i o n . I understand that the s t e r i l i z a -
t ion must be considered permanent and not revers ib le . I have decided that I do 
not want to become pregnant or bear ch i l d ren , but understand that the results from 
th is procedure cannot be guaranteed. 
I was to ld about those temporary methods of b i r t h control that are avai lable 
and could be provided to me which w i l l al low me to bear a ch i ld in the fu tu re . I 
have rejected these al ternat ives and chosen to be s t e r i l i z e d . 
j ^ I understand that I w i l l be s t e r i l i z e d by an operation known as ffi ^rf&X'/Jo/J 
KJoJlKiu\ , / f / ^ ^ / fec^The discomforts, r isks and benefi ts associated with the 
operation hive been explained to me. A l l my questions have been answered to my 
sa t i s fac t i on . 
I , ^yVy\j? (? o ^ O b ^ r i c P > hereby consent of my own free w i l l to be 
s t e r i l i z e d by ( \ r , v(\>W\as\lh A , > M.D. and/or associates and assistants 
of his/her choice to perform the fo l lowing operation upon me at the McKay-Dee 
Hospital Center ( c i r c l e one) laparoscopic tubal coagulat ion, pomeroy tubal l i g a t i o n , 
salpingectomy, hulka c l i p . 
Patient Signature 
vJ 
Signature of W/i/tness 
(IF AN INTERPRETER IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE STERILIZED) 
I have translated the information and advice presented o ra l l y to the indiv idual to 
be s t e r i l i z e d by the person obtaining th is consent. I have also read to 
_ _ ^ ^ the consent form in
 r _______^__ language and 
explained i t s contents. To the best of my knowledge and be l i e f , she understood 
th is explanation. 
Interpreter Date 
Form # 686-AB-5/84R-596 
